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THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY:
ITS DEVELOPMENT, SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
A Memorable Fancy
I was in a Printing house in Hell, & saw the method in which knowledge
is transmitted from generation to generation.
In the first chamber was a Dragon-Man, clearing away the rubbish
from a cave's mouth; within, a number of Dragons were hollowing the
cave.
In the second chamber was a Viper folding round the rock & the
cave, and others adorning it with gold, silver and precious stones.
In the third chamber was an Eagle with wings and feathers of air:
he caused the inside of the cave to be infinite; around were numbers of
Eagle-like men who built palaces in the immense cliffs.
In the fourth chamber were Lions of flaming fire, raging around &
melting the metals into living fluids.
In the fifth chamber were Unnam'd forms, which cast the metals
into the expanse.
There they were receiv'd by Men who occupied the sixth chamber,
and took the form of books & were arranged in libraries.1
I.
Introduction
In his essay on legal reasoning, Dean Edward H. Levi
characterizes Anglo-American legal reasoning as reasoning
by example. He writes: 2
I Blake, A Memorable Fancy in THE ComPL "E Poamy AND S.IrECm
PROSE or JoHx DONNE & TaE CoiaIrnrE PoETRY OF WILLzAm BLAKE 657 (Random
House 1941).
2 LEVI, AN INTRODUCTIOI TO LEGAL RFASONInG 1-2 (1949).
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The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by
example. It is reasoning from case to case. It is a three-step
process described by the doctrine of precedent in which a
proposition descriptive of the first case is made into a rule
of law and then applied to a next similar situation. The steps
are these: similarity is seen between cases; next the rule of
law inherent in the first case is announced; then the rule of
law is made applicable to the second case. This is a method
of reasoning necessary for the law, but it has characteristics
which under other circumstances might be considered imper-
fections.
Some serious students have expressed doubt whether this
method is adequate for the needs of our present expanding
society, where the problem is not so much the adjustment
of private interests, but the regulation of state and social
rights and obligations.3 Be that as it may, in the develop-
ment of the right of privacy, we have a very good example
of the process of which Dean Levi spoke. For it was gradual.
It began with its assertion on the basis of common law prin-
ciples by writers and jurists. And in its gradual adoption
and application to the various problems which the swift
means of communication and the modern newspaper tech-
nic asseverated by radio and television, seeking to mirror
a great variety of activities, it unfolded, despite judicial
reluctance in many quarters and impediments placed upon
it by administrative limitations and legislative enactments.
And, today, we can formulate very definite rules and criteria
to apply to almost every ordinary assertion of the right.
II.
The Origin of the Right
The right of privacy has been defined by a court which
declined to recognize its existence, in the absence of state
legislation on the subject, as '
3 Cooper, The Common and the Civil Law - A Scot's View, 63 HAxv. L.
REv. 468, 474-5 (1950).
4 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442, 443
(1902).
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... founded upon the claim that a man has the right to pass
through this world, if he wills, without having his picture pub-
lished, his business enterprises discussed, his successful experi-
ments written up for the benefit of others, or his eccentricities
commented upon either in handbills, circulars, catalogues,
periodicals, or newspapers; and, necessarily, that the things
which may not be written and published of him must not be
spoken of him by his neighbors, whether the comment be
favorable or otherwise.
It is customary'to trace the assertion of the existence of
the right to a noted essay by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis, which appeared in 1890.' Theirs was the convic-
tion that the press, even at that time was "overstepping in
every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of de-
cency." 6 They particularized: I
Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the
vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with
industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the
details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns
of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon
column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured
by intrusion upon the domestic circle. The intensity and com-
plexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have
rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man,
under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensi-
tive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become
more essential to the individual; but modem enterprise and
invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected
him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be
inflicted by mere bodily injury.
And, after analyzing the instances in which the common law
had protected a person from the publication, without his
consent, of his letters, papers or documents, which expressed
his innermost thoughts, sentiments and emotions, they
reached this conclusion: 8
It is believed that the common law provides him with one
[a remedy], forged in the slow fire of the centuries, and to-day
fitly tempered to his hand. The common law has always
5 Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAav. L. REv. 193 (1890).
6 Id. at 196.
7 Ibid.
8 Id. at 220.
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recognized a man's house as his castle, impregnable, often,
even to its own officers engaged in the execution of its
commands.
One may wonder why Brandeis, who, later as a crusader
in many public matters, relied upon the press of the country
to achieve public ends, should have taken so dismal a view
of the evils of some types of modern intrusion on privacy and
private affairs. But there is no dichotomy between the two
attitudes. For it is quite evident that, imbued with the spirit
of the nineteenth-century liberalism, Brandeis feared many
social or governmental actions which intruded upon that
domain which he considered the privacy of the individual,
into which no one should enter without consent. For we find
that, later in 1928, in one of his noted dissents, he asserted
as one of the protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights
even against the Government, ". . . the right to be let alone
- the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men." 10 He added: "To protect that
right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment." 11
Other writers have sustained the right in less absolute
terms by insisting that a man's feelings are entitled to pro-
tection against injury. Roscoe Pound has written: 12
A man's feelings are as much a part of his personality as
his limbs. The actions that protect the latter from injury may
well be made to protect the former by the ordinary process of
legal growth.
9 MASON, BRANDEiS, A FREz MAL's LiFE 280-1, 329 (1946).
10 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed.
944 (1928).
11 Id., 277 U.S. at 478.
12 Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARv. L. REv. 343, 363-4 (1915).
While it is said that traditionally the mere injury to feelings is not recognized
in the law of torts, there is, in reality, a constant enlargement of the approach
to this problem. And many cases exist where injury to feelings has been held
compensable. Illustrative are the cases where the intrusion of an innkeeper upon
the privacy of guests accusing them of improper conduct have been held com-
pensable although no others than strangers were present. Emmke v. De Silva,
293 Fed. 17 (8th Cir. 1923); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in
the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. Rzv. 1033, 1051-60 (1936).
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III.
The Right of Privacy Before the Courts
The first high court which considered the existence of the
right of privacy was the Court of Appeals of New York.
1 3
The majority of the court refused to follow the reasoning of
Warren and Brandeis and of the authorities on which they
relied, as too nebulous to call for judicial recognition and too
dangerous to be established by judicial fiat. Speaking for
the majority of the court, Chief Judge Parker wrote: "
If such a principle be incorporated into the body of the law
through the instrumentality of a court of equity, the attempts
to logically apply the principle will necessarily result not only
in a vast amount of litigation, but in litigation bordering upon
the absurd, for the right of privacy, once established as a legal
doctrine, cannot be confined to the restraint of the publication
of a likeness, but must necessarily embrace as well the publica-
tion of a word picture, a comment upon one's looks, conduct,
domestic relations or habits. And, were the right of privacy
once legally asserted, it would necessarily be held to include
the same things if spoken instead of printed, for one, as well
as the other, invades the right to be absolutely let alone. An
insult would certainly be in violation of such a right, and with
many persons would more seriously wound the feelings than
'3 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
14 Id, 64 N.E. at 443. More than thirty years later the same court was to
assert explicitly that: "except to the limited extent provided by statute (Civil
Rights Law [Consol. Laws, c. 61, § 50), there is no right of privacy. Roberson
v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442, 59 L.R.A. 478, 89
Am. St. Rep. 828. Written words, the effect of which is to invade privacy
and to bring undesired notoriety, are without remedy, unless they also
appreciably affect reputation. This is the domain, not of positive law, but of
obedience to the unenforceable. 'Law and Manners' by Lord Moulton, 134
The Atlantic Monthly 1. From such harms one is protected only by the
code of common decency." Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc.,
262 N.Y. 99, 186 N.E. 217, 218 (1933). The article involved in the Kimmerle
case stated that a woman conducting a rooming-house was "courted" there by a
murderer later hanged. After ruling that no recovery could be had for violation
of privacy, the court also held that the article was not libelous, saying: "Without
a suggestion in the article to the discredit of plaintiff, how could any just and
right-thinking person reading it entertain any feelings except regret and sympathy
for plaintiff? Embarrassment and discomfort no doubt came to her from the
publication, as they would to any decent woman under like circumstances. Her own
reaction, however, has no bearing upon her reputation. That rests entirely upon
the reactions of others." Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, supra, 186 N.E.
at 218.
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would the publication of their picture. And so we might add
to the list of things that are spoken and done day by day
which seriously offend the sensibilities of good people to which
the principle which the plaintiff seeks to have imbedded in the
doctrine of the law would seem to apply.
Judge Gray, writing for the minority, felt that the plaintiff
in the case, who sought injunction against the use of her
likeness for advertising purposes, could be protected upon
the same grounds on which courts had theretofore protected
the right of privacy in cases relating to private writings or
unauthorized publications. He wrote: 1"
It seems to me that the principle which is applicable is
analogous to that upon which courts of equity have interfered
to protect the right of privacy in cases of private writings, or
of other unpublished products of the mind. The writer or the
lecturer has been protected in his right to a literary property
in a letter or a lecture, against its unauthorized publication,
because it is property, to which the right of privacy at-
taches.... I think that this plaintiff has the same property
in the right to be protected against the use of her face for
defendant's commercial purposes as she would have if they
were publishing her literary compositions.
The cases which recognize the right of privacy, - the
right to be let alone, or "the liberty of privacy", - begin
with a decision by the Supreme Court of Georgia rendered
in 1905.16 It, too, involved the use of a photograph for ad-
vertising purposes. In declining to follow the New York
decision, the court asserted that the right existed and was
entitled to recognition by the courts. Justice Cobb, writing
for a unanimous court, stated: "
The liberty of privacy exists, has been recognized by the
law, and is entitled to continual recognition. But it must be
15 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442, 450
(1902).
16 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
There were, however, earlier recognitions of the right by lower courts. Corliss v.
E. W. Walker Co., 64 Fed. 280 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894); Corliss v. E. W. Walker
Co., 57 Fed. 434 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893).
17 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 72-3
(1905).
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kept within its proper limits, and in its exercise must be made
to accord with the rights of those who have other liberties,
as well as the rights of any person who may be properly
interested in the matters which are claimed to be of purely
private concern. Publicity in many cases is absolutely essential
to the welfare of the public. Privacy in other matters is not
only essential to the welfare of the individual, but also to the
well-being of society.
The cases which followed have sustained the right either
as a property right by analogy to property in private writ-
ings, or, more broadly, as a right to one's own personality. 8
At the present time, the right exists by virtue of judicial de-
cisions in Alabama, Arizona, California, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon and
Pennsylvania."9 The Restatement of Torts now gives recog-
nition to the right.2 °
18 See, Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E. (2d)
306 (1949); Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W. (2d) 911
(1948); Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P. (2d) 438 (1941).
19 41 Am. JUR. Privacy § 2 (1942); TAYER, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PRESS
§§ 69-71 (2d ed. 1950); YANY-wicH, IT's LiBEi OR CONTEMPT Ir Your PRINT IT
274 et seq. (1950); Annotations, Right of privacy, 14 A.L.R. (2d) 750 (1950),
168 A.L.R. 446 (1947), 138 A.L.R. 22 (1942); 22 So. CALIF. L. REv. 320 (1949);
13 So. CAnE. L. REv. 81 (1939). See complete list of cases to date supporting the
right of privacy in Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 239 P. (2d) 630, 632 (Cal. 1952).
In Montana, a landlord, who was offended by the fact that -his tenants paid no
attention to a notice terminating a month to month leasehold to a home, actually
moved into the premises with his wife and remained in the living room for seven-
teen days and nights. A verdict in favor of the tenants was sustained on the
ground that the intrusion was a violation of the right of privacy and actionable
without proof of actual damage. The jury failed to award compensatory damages,
but awarded exemplary damages. Welsh v. Pritchard, 241 P. (2d) 816 (Mont.
1952). The court said, 241 P. (2d) at 820, "The law presumes that the usurpation
by strangers, as here, of a man's home, and their continued intrusion for 17 days
and nights into the very heart and privacy of his family life, resulted in detriment
and damage."
On June 11, 1952, the Illinois appellate court gave limited recognition to the
right of privacy in the State of Illinois. It reversed a trial court which had
dismissed a complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The complaint charged
that the defendants, without the consent of the plaintiff, had used her photograph
in an advertisement promoting the sale of dog food. Virginia Eick v. Perk Dog
Food Co., (No. 45461, Ill. 1952).
20 RESTATEMT, TORTS § 867 (1939).
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,IV.
Limitations on Creation and Expression
The problem of privacy is, at times, treated as a part of
the law of defamation. In reality, the relation between the
two is rather remote, - the only similarity stemming from
the fact that both are based on a recognition by the courts
of certain rights inherent in personality. But there the simi-
larity ends. For defamation is an injury to reputation -
that is, injury in the eyes of others - while privacy is injury
to one's own feelings - the right to be let alone. For this
reason, different criteria obtain in determining when action
lies.
In defamation, the publication must be such as to expose
a person to hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy by imputing
to him qualities which, in the minds of a segment of the
population, are undesirable. But publications which invade
the right of privacy may be actionable, although the persons
who see the publication may find nothing objectionable in it.
The important thing is that the publication injures the feel-
ings of the person himself, although it may not have any
effect whatsoever on his reputation.
A. The Restrictions of the Law of Defamation:
What has just been said indicates that the recognition of
the right of privacy was not called for so much by the defi-
ciencies of the law of defamation as by the desire to add a
new right which rendered protection in a domain which the
law of defamation did not enter. For it should be stated that
the law of defamation has offered and does offer adequate
protection against injuries to reputation perpetrated by the
various media of communication and expression. One of the
most important of these is the portrayal of a recognizable
character in an objectionable way. These have been held to
be actionable when they occurred in newspapers, books or
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in motion pictures, although the particular person may not
have been aimed at at all. Indeed, the rule has been applied
in cases where the persons writing or producing the article,
picture or play, did not even know of the existence of the
person who claims to have been harmed. The answer of the
courts to such plea has always been that it was enough if a
jury could infer that one reading the newspaper article,
seeing the play or motion picture, could draw the inference
that the reference was to the plaintiff. An outstanding illus-
tration comes from the field of motion pictures.
Years ago, there was produced a motion picture entitled
"Rasputin, The Mad Monk." In it there was an episode in
which the monk was supposed to either rape or seduce a
noble woman of the court. The victim in the play was called
Princess Natasha. Princess Irina Alexandrovna, wife of
Prince Youssoupoff, a resident of Paris, brought suit in the
English courts against the producers of the play, Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Limited. She asserted that the
character of Natasha was patterned after her own life and
that many persons recognized her portrayal in that char-
acter. A jury awarded her 25,000 pounds. On appeal, the
judgment was sustained, the court holding that it was for
the jury to determine (a) whether there was a recognizable
similarity between the character in the picture and the prin-
cess, and (b) whether the producers intended the character
in the play to represent her. Having reached that conclusion,
the court said that the libelous character of the picture was
evident, whether the lady was actually raped or seduced,
in the sense in which that milder term is understood. Lord
Justice Slesser summed up his reasoning on these issues in
this manner: 21
When the question is as propounded in Hulton and Co.,
Limited v. Jones, 26 The Times L.R. 128, [1910] A.C. 20,
16 Ann. Cas. 166, and later cases, what persons of a reasonable
21 Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd., 50 T.L.R. 581, 99
A.L.R. 864, 876-7 (1934).
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class might think about a matter, I can see no objection to the
fact that it is sought to be proved that persons who read
Russian books, persons versed in Russian history, and friends
of the plaintiff all conceived this imaginary Princess Natasha
to be the plaintiff. The fact that the matter was approached
from several angles and that different persons from different
points of view took the same view seems to strengthen and
not to weaken her case, because, from all these angles, these
persons came and all said, some with certainty, some with
comparative doubt but at any rate in the end, that sooner
or later in the film they made up their minds that this was
meant to represent the plaintiff ...
I, for myself, cannot see that from the plaintiff's point of
view it matters in the least whether this libel suggests that
she has been seduced or ravished. The question whether she
is or is not the more or the less moral seems to me immaterial
in considering this question whether she has been defamed,
and for this reason, that, as has been frequently pointed out
in libel, not only is the matter defamatory, if it brings the
plaintiff into hatred, ridicule, or contempt by reason of some
moral discredit on her part, but also if it tends to make the
plaintiff be shunned and avoided and that without any moral
discredit on her part. It is for that reason that persons who
have been alleged to have been insane, or to be suffering
from certain diseases, and other cases where no direct moral
responsibility could be placed upon them, have been held to
be entitled to bring an action to protect their reputation and
their honour.
One may, I think, take judicial notice of the fact that a
lady of whom it has been said that she has been ravished,
albeit against her will, has suffered in social reputation and in
opportunities of receiving respectful consideration from the
world.
Other illustrations, which may be referred to without
comment,22 show that the limitation has been applied to all
22 Burton v. Crowell Pub. Co., 82 F. (2d) 154 (2d Cir. 1936) (publication
of distorted photograph which placed the person in a ridiculous position); Stanley
v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 64 Ga. App. 228, 12 S.E. (2d) 441 (1940) (members
of a prison board portrayed as inhuman in a motion picture taken from a book,
I Am a Fugitive From a Georgia Chain-Gang); Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v.
Stanley, 56 Ga. App. 85, 192 S.E. 300 (1937); Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348,
243 N.W. 82 (1932); Hartmann v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E. (2d) 30
(1947) (verbal attacks on public persons by radio); Brown v. Paramount Publix
Corp., 240 App. Div. 520, 270 N.Y. Supp. 544 (3d Dep't 1934) (motion picture
portraying plaintiff as illiterate and neglectful of her daughter, whom she permitted
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media of communication, and that, even in the absence of
the right of privacy, actions will lie for libelous or distorted
portrayals of one's actual personality or of a personality
which jurors may believe represented him in plays, books,
photographic reproductions, motion pictures and radio.
So, when dealing with cases which, aside from any libelous
connotation, grant relief for violation of the right of privacy,
it is well to consider them against this background. When so
considered, it must be evident that the cases stemming from
recognition of the right of privacy have added additional
restrictions to the rights of expression and creation.
B. Private or Public Matters:
If, in the matter just referred to, there is a distinction
between the law of defamation and the law of privacy, in
other matters there is similarity. Early in the history of the
law of privacy, the courts, by analogy with the law of de-
famation, adopted the distinction so well rooted in that
branch of the law between purely private matters and mat-
ters which are the concern of the public because they relate
to things of public interest or to persons in the public eye.
Indeed, Warren and Brandeis noted that the recognition of
to have clandestine relations with a man); Merle v. Sociological Research Film
Corp., 166 App. Div. 376, 152 N.Y. Supp. 829 (1st Dep't 1915) (motion picture
dealing with the white-slave traffic picturing the plaintiff's factory with his name
on a sign and implying that the place was used for illicit rendezvous; Cassidy v.
Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd., [1929] 2 K.B. 331 (CA.), 45 T.L.R. 485 (picture
in newspaper of General Corrigan and a young lady at the races with a caption
intimating that they were engaged, the General already being married) ; E. Hulton
& Co. v. Jones, [1910] A.C. 20, 26 T.L.R. 128 (1909) (article about fictitious
character named Artemus Jones libelous as to person so named); Monson v.
Tussauds Ltd., [1894] 1 Q.B. 671 (CA.), 10 T.L.R. 227 (where the court enjoined
as libelous the placing of an effigy of a person in Mme. Tussaud's famous wax
works in London on top of "Chamber of Horrors" under circumstances that
might intimate the person's connection with a murder). And see, Wright v. R.K.O.
Radio Pictures, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1944) (where the right is
recognized, although no actionable matter is found); Feely v. Vitagraph Co. of
America, 184 App. Div. 527, 172 N.Y. Supp. 264- (2d Dep't 1918); 33 Am. rJR.
Libel and Slander § 102 (1941); 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 82 (1948); Annota-
tions, Legal aspects of radio communication and broadcasting, 171 A.L.R. 765,
82 A.L.R. 1106, 76 A.L.R. 1272.
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the right would not prohibit the publication of that which is
of public or general interest,23 or of matters which, under
the law of defamation, would be privileged communications.24
This distinction is to be found in some of the earliest
cases on the subject.25
The Court of Appeals of New York, in declining to give
recognition to the right, refused to see any distinction be-
tween public and private characters.26 But other cases draw
a clear line between the two. We refer, in brief, to some cases
old and new.
A California motion picture concern published a fictitious
letter allegedly signed by the plaintiff, which read: 27
"Dearest:
"Don't breathe it to a soul, but I'm back in Los Angeles
and more curious than ever to see you. Remember how I cut
up about a year ago? Well, I'm raring to go again, and
believe me I'm in the mood for fun.
"Let's renew our acquaintanceship and I promise you an
evening you won't forget. Meet me in front of Warners Down-
If to this, we add publications which, although harmless, are actionable because
they result in special damages, Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225, 23 L. Ed. 308, 313-4
(1876) ; 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 8 (1948), it is quite evident that the redress
offered by the law of defamation for injury to reputation is very broad in scope.
More, historical research is actually hampered by decisions such as State v. Haffer,
94 Wash. 136, 162 Pac. 45 (1916), in which a criminal prosecution was sustained
for a libel on George Washington.
23 Warren and Brandeis, supra note 5, at 212.
24 Id. at 216.
25 See note 16 supra.
26 Judge Parker wrote: "This distinction between public and private char-
acters cannot possibly be drawn. On what principle does an author or artist forfeit
his right of privacy, and a great orator, a great preacher, or a great advocate
retain his? Who can draw a line of demarcation between public characters and
private characters, let that line be as wavering and irregular as you please? ...
Or is the right of privacy the possession of mediocrity alone, which a person
forfeits by giving rein to his ability, spurs to his industry, or grandeur to his
character? A lady may pass her life in domestic privacy, when, by some act of
heroism or self-sacrifice, her name and fame fill the public ear. Is she to forfeit
by her good deed the right of privacy she previously possessed?" Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442, 447 (1902).
27 Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal. App. (2d) 207, 127 P. (2d) 577;
579 (1942).
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town Theatre at 7th and Hill on Thursday. Just look for a





The name of the person was also the name of the chief
feminine character of a motion picture, which the defendant
was advertising. Although the coincidence was fortuitous,
the court held that the plaintiff's right of privacy had been
invaded, saying: 28
As already indicated, the letter was circulated by defen-
dants for the purpose of advertising a moving picture, and as
far as appears they had no intent to refer therein to plaintiff
and did not know of her existence, although they might easily
have discovered it. These facts, which are stressed by defen-
dants, tend to show want of malice and might avert an award
of punitive damages, but they constitute no defense to plain-
tiff's action. The letter did, in fact, refer to plaintiff in clear
and definite fashion, and would reasonably have been so
understood by anyone who knew of her existence. The
wrong complained of is the invasion of plaintiff's right
of privacy, and such an invasion is no less real or damaging
because the invader supposed he was in other territory. The
case bears considerable analogy, both as to the right invaded
and the nature of the injury inflicted, to one of libel. It is
well established that inadvertence or mistake affords no defense
to a charge of libel, where the defamatory publication does,
in fact, refer to the plaintiff. . . . "The question is not so
much who was aimed at as who was hit." [Emphasis added.]
28 Id., 127 P. (2d) at 581. However, under N.Y. CIvrL RIGHTs LAW § 51,
the mere use of a name does not give rise to a cause of action in favor of every
person who bears the name. Thus, a person named "Rudy Nebb" could not sue
for use of the same name for a fictitious character. Nebb v. Bell Syndicate, Inc.,
41 F. Supp. 929, 930 (S.D. N.Y. 1941). Here, judge Goddard gave these reasons:
"There must be an intent to capitalize another's name and identity or acts which
tend to produce that result. The clear intent of the statute and its purposes is to
prevent such a violation of another's right of privacy. Cf. Rhodes v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 193 N.Y. 223, 85 N.E. 1097, 34 L.RA., N.S., 1143, 127 Am. St.
Rep. 945 .... I take it that the words 'his name' in the statute apply to the
use of a name coupled with circumstances tending to refer to the plaintiff and not
to a mere similarity of names. Neither the use of another's name, which has
acquired an unique significance or secondary meaning in a certain field, nor the
trading upon the reputation of another, is involved here."
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In a more recent California case, the publication of the
photograph of a husband and wife in an affectionate position
in the Ladies' Home Journal as a part of an article on "Love"
was held to be an invasion of privacy and not warranted by
public need or the public character of the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs were owners of a confectionery and ice cream con-
cession in the Farmers' Market in Los Angeles. The photo-
graph depicted them as apparently seated on stools side by
side at the patron's side of the counter of their concession.
The plaintiff had his arm around his wife and was leaning
forward with his cheek against hers. Under the picture ap-
peared the caption, "Publicized as glamorous, desirable, 'love
at first sight' is a bad risk." 29 Justice Carter, writing for a
unanimous court, could see no justification for the use of the
particular picture: 1o
Assuming it to be within the range of public interest in
dissemination of news, information or education, and in a
medium that would not be classed as commercial - for profit
or advertising - there appears no necessity for the use in
connection with the article without their consent, of a photo-
graph of plaintiffs. The article, to fulfill its purpose and
satisfy the public interest, if any, in the subject matter dis-
cussed, could, possibly, stand alone without any picture. In
any event, the public interest did not require the use of any
particular person's likeness nor that of plaintiffs without their
consent.
The other side of the shield is presented by cases which
hold that if the activities to which the publication or dis-
closure relates are public, or the person concerned is a public
character, the publication or disclosure does not constitute
an invasion of the right of privacy.
So, in conjunction with a news report of a woman's suicide,
the invasion of the husband's right of privacy by his name
29 Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 239 P. (2d) 630, 632 (Cal. 1952).
30 Id. at 634. Similarly, the impersonation on a broadcast of a privately
employed chauffeur who was held up by a robber and shot, was held to constitute
an invasion of privacy under California law. Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28
F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
being mentioned in the publication was held to be an inci-
dent which was not protected.31
A similar conclusion was reached in another state which
does not recognize the right of privacy. A Seattle, Washing-
ton, newspaper, in speaking of an arrest, published a photo-
graph of the plaintiff's family, including that of his minor
daughter. The court held that, as the publication was not
libelous, there was no remedy for the invasion of any right.1
2
In a very recent federal case, Judge Nordbye of the United
States District Court of Minnesota, reached a similar con-
clusion as to the unauthorized publication of a photograph
of a courtroom scene showing two persons involved in a
divorce proceeding. So doing, he emphasized the fact that,
by present newspaper standards, matters of this character
are of public interest: 11
By the accepted standards of most of the newspapers in
this country, and certainly a goodly number of the people,
court proceedings such as the Berg contest over custody of
the children constitute legitimate news in view of the circum-
stances related, and the publication of Berg's picture in con-
nection with the legitimate news was within the scope of the
accepted prerogatives assumed by the Press, which is charged
with the responsibility of furnishing news to the public.
C. Persons in Public Life:
The case for publication of articles concerning pictures of
persons in public life is even stronger, and was recognized in
3' Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 304, 95 P. (2d) 491
(1939).
32 Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594 (1911). In a later
case, the same court enjoined the unauthorized use of the name of the late
Senator Robert M. LaFollette on the name of a political party. So doing, the
court, while not recognizing the law of privacy, used the following emphatic
language as to the right of a person to his own name: "Nothing so exclusively
belongs to a man or is so personal and valuable to him as his name. His reputation
and the character he has built up are inseparably connected with it. Others can
have no right to use it without his express consent, and he has a right to go into
any court at any time to enjoin or prohibit any unauthorized use of it. Nor is it
necessary that it be alleged or proved that such unauthorized use will damage him."
State ex rel. LaFollette v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86, 229 Pac. 317, 319 (1924).
33 Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 962 (D. Minn.
1948).
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the earliest cases on the subject.34 A leading case arose in
New York, which does not recognize the right of privacy.
William J. Sidis was made the subject of a biographical
sketch in The New Yorker for August 14, 1937. Sidis had
once been considered a."boy genius," and the article dealt
with his past and not his most recent career. It was argued
that he, having lapsed into obscurity, had ceased to be a
public figure, and was entitled to have this obscurity re-
spected. The court, rejecting this contention, said: "
William James Sidis was once a public figure. As a child
prodigy, he excited both admiration and curiosity. Of him
great deeds were expected. In 1910, he was a person about
whom the newspapers might display a legitimate intellectual
interest, in the sense meant by Warren and Brandeis, as dis-
tinguished from a trivial and unseemly curiosity. But the
precise motives of the press we regard as unimportant. And
even if Sidis had loathed public attention at that time, we
think his uncommon achievements and personality would have
made the attention permissible. Since then Sidis has cloaked
himself in obscurity, but his subsequent history, containing
as it did the answer to the question of whether or not he had
fulfilled his early promise, was still a matter of public concern.
The article in The New Yorker sketched the life of an unusual
personality, and it possessed considerable popular news in-
terest.
We express no comment on whether or not the news worthi-
ness of the matter printed will always constitute a complete
defense. Revelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted
in view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's
notions of decency. But when focused upon public characters,
truthful comments upon dress, speech, habits, and the ordinary
aspects of personality will usually not transgress this line.
Regrettably or not, the misfortunes and frailties of neighbors
and "public figures" are subjects of considerable interest and
discussion to the rest of the population. And when such are
the mores of the community, it would be unwise for a court
to bar their expression in the newspapers, books, and magazines
of the day.
34 See note 16 supra.
35 Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F. (2d) 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940). See O'Brien
v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F. (2d) 167 (5th Cir. 1942).
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A man, who was a defendant in a nationally discussed
sedition trial, became the object of legitimate public interest
and comment on his life did not invade the right of privacy.36
The basis of these decisions is that when a person be-
comes a public character, he relinquishes the right of privacy
so as to permit exploitation of his life without any limitation
as to time.
In a recent California case, the plaintiff had entered the
prize ring as a professional boxer in 1933, under the name
of Canvasback Cohen. His ring career, a losing one, continued
until 1939, when he abandoned it. On January 12, 1949,
Groucho Marx, the well-known comedian, broadcast on the
program "You Bet Your Life" of the American Broadcasting
Company this statement: "I once managed a prize-fighter,
Canvasback Cohen. I brought him out here, he got knocked
out, and I made him walk back to Cleveland." 17 Upholding
the trial court, which had sustained a demurrer to the com-
plaint, the court ruled that there had been an absolute waiver
of the right of privacy which the lapse of time did not rein-
state. The court said: 3
A person who by his accomplishments, fame or mode of
life, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the
public a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs, or character,
is said to become a public personage, and thereby relinquishes
a part of his.right of privacy....
Applying the foregoing rule to the facts in the present case
it is evident that when plaintiff sought publicity and the
adulation of the public, he relinquished his right to privacy on
matters pertaining to his professional activity, and he could
not at his will and whim draw himself like a snail into his
shell and hold others liable for commenting upon the acts
36 Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F. (2d) 467 (D.C. Cir. 1946). The representation
in a non-fiction work of a recognizabla woman character giving her first name,
Zelma, identified as "the census taker," and depicting her as a strong, colorful
personality, given to extensive use of profanity, which is likely to bring humiliation
to her, is an invasion of the right of privacy. Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20
So. (2d) 243 (1944).
37 Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. (2d) 704, 211 P. (2d) 320, 321 (1949).
38 Ibid.
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which had taken place when he had voluntarily exposed himself
to the public eye. As to such acts he had waived his right
of privacy and he could not at some subsequent period rescind
his waiver.
However, membership in the armed forces of the United
States, even if accompanied by the release of a photograph
by the War Department showing a person to be a member
of a team of optical experts engaged in repairing lenses at
the front, is not sufficient to warrant the unauthorized use
of the photograph by a commercial concern. This upon the
theory that the service as a member of the armed forces
does not make one a public personage so as to make his
likeness and activities a matter of general interest, and, that,
while the Army might acquire the right to use the photograph
for its purposes, there is no implied warrant for its use by
others for commercial purposes. The court said: 11
The complaint describes no hero, famous personality or
individual of preeminent accomplishments whose doings are
items of legitimate news and general interest. Under the facts
pleaded the general public could have no interest in the
appellee other than as the symbol of an organization with
which it was greatly concerned.
In any event a waiver of the right justifies an invasion of
privacy only to the extent warranted by the circumstances
which brought about the waiver. Pavesich v. New England
39 Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 650, 86 N.E. (2d) 306
(1949).
A somewhat similar ruling was made under the law of Pennsylvania. The
plaintiff, a minor, had been involved in an automobile accident and twenty
months after, a newspaper photograph, as she lay in the street, was reproduced
in a magazine. Holding that while the publication in the newspaper immediately
after the accident may have been privileged, the republication in the magazine was
not, the court said: "Granted that she was 'newsworthy' with regard to her traffic
accident. Assume, also, that she continued to be newsworthy with regard to that
particular accident for an indefinite time afterward. This use of her picture had
nothing at all to do with her accident. It related to the general subject of traffic
accidents and pedestrian carelessness. Yet the facts, so far as we know them
in this case, show that the little girl, herself, was at the time of her accident not
careless and the motorist was. The picture is used in connection with several
headings tending to say that this plaintiff narrowly escaped death because she was
careless of her own safety. That is not libelous; a count for defamation was
dropped out in the course of the trial. But we are not talking now about liability
for defamation. We are talking about the privilege to invade her interest in being
left alone." Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F. (2d) 974, 977-8 (10th Cir. 1951).
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Life Ins. Co., supra. In the instant case the appellee had no
right of privacy against the Army's use of his picture in the
furtherance of its policy in building home-front morale but
that situation cannot be stretched into a license to private
business to use the same for advertising its wares for
individual profits.
All these cases postulate a waiver of the private character
either through public activities or through actual consent.
In the latter respect, they follow the well-known rule that
no one can complain of a tort to which he has assented.4"
But where the permission is limited, use beyond the agreed
terms will be considered a violation of privacy.4
V.
The Scope of Protection
The instances which have warranted judicial interference
may be divided into three groups. The first relates to cases
of intrusion into a person's private life. In this category are:
(a) use of a person's name, likeness or photograph or sale
of a person's photograph; (b) the exhibition of x-ray pictures
showing a: part of a person's body; (c) the representation
of a patient in a hospital; (d) the use of a name in a petition
or in connection with other political or governmental mat-
ters; (e) unreasonable use of a person's name in a book;
(f) use of a person's name in a literary production or a
motion picture.
In the second group are publications of letters, private
writings, or papers belonging to another. They are forbidden
when (a) they are an infringement of one's right to the pro-
duct of one's mind, or (b) their publication would amount
to a breach of contract, confidence or trust.
The third group is what is called in the law of unfair
competition, "palming off" or "holding oneself out." They
40 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905);
Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E. (2d) 306 (1949).
41 Burton v. Crowell Pub. Co., 82 F. (2d) 154 (2d Cir. 1936); Neyland v.
Home Pattern Co., 65 F. (2d) 363 (2d Cir. 1933); Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co,
57 Fed. 434 (C.C.D. Mass. f893).
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include assumption of the name, character or title of another
and actual impersonation. In California, we had the case
of a comedian who not only imitated the mannerisms of
Charles Chaplin, but actually assumed the name of Charles
Aplin. These cases are decided on the principles which under-
lie the law of unfair appropriation or unfair competition.42
In applying the law to these situations, the courts bear in
mind the distinction already adverted to between use for
commercial purposes and use as a part of legitimate attempts
to disseminate news or information or exercise of a creative
art. The line of demarcation is difficult to draw at times,
but it exists nevertheless. And courts are more likely to see
an invasion of the right when gain is the motive than when
the object is dissemination of news by newspapers, radio,
television and other media of communication, or fiction-
alizing.
As a part of the right of privacy, courts have condemned
eavesdropping, and its modern form, telephone wire tapping,
if done by private individuals.43
42 21 Am. J u. Privacy §§ 20-33 (1939) ; Annotations, Right of privacy, 168
A.L.R. 446, 456-64 (1947), 138 A.L.R. 22, 63-97 (1942). And see, Yankwich,
Originality in the Law of Intellectual Property, 11 F.R.D. 457, 465, 480-1 (1952).
Aside from the protection afforded by the law of literary property, our courts
do not recognize what has come to be known in continental Europe as the "moral
right of the author" - the right of an author not to have his product, be it art
or literature, tampered with or deformed. See Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral
Right, 53 HAnv. L. REv. 529 (1940). Thus, a New York court refused to interfere
with the use of the uncopyrighted music of the Russian composers Shostakovich,
Khachaturian, Prokofieff and Miaskovsky in a motion picture which depicted
conditions in Russia in a manner which the composers thought false and disloyal
to their country. Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67,
S0 N.Y.S. (2d) 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 275 App. Div. 692, 87 N.Y.S. (2d) 430
(1st Dep't 1949).
43 McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E. (2d)
810 (1939); Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W. (2d) 46 (1931); 41 Am.
JUR. Privacy § 29 (1942). However, we have become accustomed to the thought
that wire tapping is being practiced by the Government, and, in California, until
stopped by the United States Supreme Court, we have shown so little respect
for the person of one accused of crime as to pump his stomach for evidence of
offense. Rochin v. People of California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. *154
(1952).
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It should be added that the right being personal, and
stemming from an assumption of injury to feelings, it does
not exist in favor of a corporation unless it can show actual
injury to its business.44 However, corporations are protected
against misuse of their names under the law of trademarks
and unfair competition.
So, without giving in detail the differentiation which may
exist in the application of the principles just given, the rules
laid down by the cases may be summed up substantially in
this manner:
(a) The right of privacy was unknown to the ancient
common law.
(b) It is purely personal, an incident of the person and
not of property. It is a recognition of the right to one's per-
sonality - a part of what Albert D. Schweitzer had called
"the reverence for life."
(c) It does not exist where the person has either pub-
lished the matter complained of, or consented to its publica-
tion. In such cases, there is a waiver.
(d) It does not exist where a person has become promi-
nent or distinguished. By such prominence he has dedicated
his life to the public and thereby waived his right to privacy.
At present, this includes persons who, for the moment, may
become the object of public interest.
(e) It does not exist in the dissemination of news and
news events, nor in the discussion of events in the life of
a person in whom the public has a rightful interest, perma-
nent or temporary, nor where the information would be of
general interest, as in the case of a candidate for public
office, or of others seeking public approval or preferment,
whether as athletes, performers, or political or social figures
of the upper world or underworld.
44 Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. 982 (W.D. Mo. 1912);
Maysville Transit Co. v. Ort, 296 Ky. 524, 177 S.W. (2d) 369, 370 (1943); 41
A.m. JutR. Privacy § 15 (1942).
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(f) A publication which, under the law of defamation,
would be a privileged communication, cannot be an invasion
of the right.
(g) The right of privacy can only be violated by print-
ings, writings, pictures or other permanent publications or
reproductions, and, ordinarily, not by word of mouth. How-
ever, broadcast by radio may be a violation.
(h) Generally, the right of action accrues when the publi-
cation is made for gain or profit. But courts now frown on
unwarranted exploitation of the personality of others, even
in the absence of the profit motive.
(i) The defense of truth - so important in defamation
- is not available in a case involving violation of the right
of privacy. Nor is motive and the presence or absence of
malice or wilfulness material.',
45 The foregoing is a revised and amplified version of the summary given in
Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91, 92-3 (1931). The expansion finds
support in the cases already referred to, and also the following: Sidis v. F-R Pub.
Corp., 113 F. (2d) 806, 809-10 (2d Cir. 1940); Levey v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc., 57 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. N.Y. 1944); Wright v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc.,
55 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1944); Davis v. General Finance & Thrift Corp., 80
Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E. (2d) 225, 227 (1950); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765,
299 S.W. 967, 969-72 (1927); Themo v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 306
Mass. 54, 27 N.E. (2d) 753 (1940); Warren and Brandeis, supra note 5, at 218
et seq.
Melvin v. Reid, supra, which brought the first recognition of privacy to
California, was a motion picture case. The defendants had produced a motion
picture entitled, "The Red Kimono," allegedly based upon incidents in the life
of the plaintiff. Feeling herself aggrieved, she brought suit. The trial court rejected
her suit on the ground that invasion of the right of privacy was not recognized
in California. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling and held that, notwith-
standing the fact that some of the incidents in the past life of the plaintiff were
true, she was entitled to the benefit of her reformation and that the motion picture
which depicted those incidents injured her. The court said: "The right to pursue
and obtain happiness is guaranteed to all by the fundamental law of our state.
This right by its very nature includes the right to live free from the unwarranted
attack of others upon one's liberty, property, and reputation. Any person living
a life of rectitude has that right to happiness which includes a freedom from
unnecessary attacks on his character, social standing, or reputation.
"The use of appellant's true name in connection with the incidents of her
former life in the plot and advertisements was unnecessary and indelicate, and a
wilful and wanton disregard of that charity which should actuate us in our social
intercourse, and which should keep us from unnecessarily holding another up
to the scorn and contempt of upright members of society .... We believe that the
publication by respondents of the unsavory incidents in the past life of the
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VI.
Statutory Rights of Privacy
By statutory enactment the right of privacy has been
given recognition in certain states where it had not had
judicial sanction. Legislation defining the right has been
enacted in New York,40 Utah4  Virginia 4  and Wisconsin."
appellant after she had reformed, coupled with her true name, was not justified
by any standard of morals or ethics known to us, and was a direct invasion of her
inalienable right guaranteed to her by our Constitution, to pursue and obtain
happiness. Whether we call this a Tight of privacy or give it any other name is
immaterial, because it is a right guaranteed by our Constitution that must not be
ruthlessly and needlessly invaded by others." Melvin v. Reid, supra, 297 Pac.
at 93-4.
As to the exclusion of matters of public interest from this protection, see
Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P. (2d) 133, 138-9 (1945);
Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 304, 95 P. (2d) 491, 495-6
(1939).
46 N.Y. CIVIL RIG=S LAW § 51.
47 UTA3 REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 103, c. 4, §§ 8, 9 (1933).
The Utah statute makes the invasion of the right of privacy for advertising
or trade purposes a misdemeanor. It also allows civil recovery for violation. In this
respect, it is patterned after the New York statute. But it goes further by making
penal the use for advertising or trade purposes of the name, portrait or picture of a
deceased person without the written consent of his heirs or personal representative.
Damages may be recovered for injury sustained by violation of this provision, and
further'and continued exploitation may be restrained by injunction. Under this
section, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Donahue v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 194 F. (2d) 6 (10th Cir. 1952), sustained an action
instituted by the heirs of Jack Donahue against the motion picture concern for
exhibiting, without permission, a fictionalized portrait of Donahue as an enter-
tainer.
The trial court had granted summary judgment. In reversing it, the court of
appeals rejected the contention that Donahue had become a public figure, and
that a statute forbidding the portrayal of a deceased public figure is a violation of
freedom of expression, saying, 194 P. (2d) at 13, "If the statute undertook to
restrict or forbid the publication of matters educational or informative or strictly
biographical in character, or the dissemination of news in the form of a newsreel
or otherwise, it would be open to challenge on the ground of objectionable restraint
upon the freedom of speech and press. But it does nothing of the kind. It is
content to forbid the appropriation of the name, picture, or personality of an
individual for commercial purposes, or for purposes of trade, as distinguished from
the publication of matters educational or informative or purely biographical in
kind, or the dissemination of news in the form of a newsreel or otherwise. And the
constitutional guaranty of free speech and free press in its full sweep does not
undertake to create an inviolate asylum for unbridled appropriation or exploitation
of the name, picture, or personality of a deceased public figure for purely com-
mercial purposes, or solely for purposes of trade, with the state powerless to enact
appropriate forbidding or remedial legislation."
48 VA. CODE tit. 8, § 650 (1950).
49 Wis. STAT. c. 348, § 412 (1951). This Wisconsin statute merely makes it a
misdemeanor to publish, except as it may be necessary in the institution or
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Under the New York Civil Rights statute, a civil action
may be instituted for improper use of a person's name or
picture for advertising or trade purposes. There is currently
before the New York Legislature a bill 50 which would make
it a misdemeanor to use the picture of any living person
without his consent in connection with written matter tend-
ing to injure him. The existing New York law has been the
subject of a very extensive jurisprudence. Because, in its
application, the courts have come to recognize the legitimate
purpose of publication of matters of public interest, a brief
discussion of these interpretations is in order. The present
section reads: 1
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within
this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of
trade without the written consent first obtained as above
provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme
court of this state against the person, firm or corporation
so using his name, portrait or picture, to prevent and restrain
the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for
any injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the defen-
dant shall have knowingly used such person's name, portrait
or picture in such manner as is forbidden or declared to be
unlawful by the last section, the jury, in its discretion, may
award exemplary damages.
The restriction in the New York statute to use for "adver-
tising purposes" has been interpreted to mean any solicita-
tion of patronage. And the word "trade" has been restricted
and limited to continuous rather than occasional or single
use." By this broad interpretation, the courts have excluded
entirely the publication of matters of public interest in news-
prosecution of a criminal proceeding, the name of a woman who may have been
raped or subjected to criminal assault. Its constitutional validity has been upheld.
State v. Evjue, 253 Wis. 146, 33 N.W. (2d) 305 (1948). For other similar statutes,
see FLA. STAT. c. 794, § 03 (1951); GA. CODE tit. 26, c. 21, § 05 (1933); S. C.
CODE § 1275 (1942).
50 S. 267, as quoted in Gray, Was Picture Necessary? Point in, Privacy Case,
Editor & Publisher, March 1, 1952, p. 49, col. 1, 2.
51 N.Y. Civsr RIGHTS LAw § 51.
52 Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N.Y. Supp.
752 (1st Dep't 1919).
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papers or newsreels as not a "trade" within the statute.53
More particularly, the following have been held outside the
statute: (a) the use of plaintiff's name in a motion picture
of current events; (b) the use of a name in a novel of
almost 400 pages; (c) the representation of plaintiff's fac-
tory on which his firm name clearly appeared, in a motion
picture dealing with a white slave traffic; (d) the use of a
name of an alleged strikebreaker in a book dealing with
strikebreaking; and (f) the attribution of a fantastic adven-
ture story to a well-known writer. 4
A New York judge has summed up the law insofar as it
relates to the unauthorized publication of photographs in a
single issue of a newspaper in this manner: 5
1. Recovery may be had under the statute if the photo-
graph is published in or as part of an advertisement, or for
advertising purposes.
2. The statute is violated if the photograph is used in con-
nection with an article of fiction in any part of the newspaper.
3. There may be no recovery under the statute for publi-
cation of a photograph in connection with an article of current
news or immediate public interest.
4. Newspapers publish articles which are neither strictly
news items nor strictly fictional in character. They are not the
responses to an event of peculiarly immediate interest but,
though based on fact, are used to satisfy an ever-present edu-
cational need. Such articles include, among others, travel
stories, stories of distant places, tales of historic personages
and events, the reproduction of items of past news, and surveys
of social conditions. These are articles educational and informa-
tive in character. As a general rule, such cases are not within
the purview of the statute.
Ih the particular case, the court held that the use of the
photograph of a Hindu musician to illustrate a semi-educa-
tional article on "the famous Hindu Rope Trick" had a
legitimate relationship to the article which was of news in-
53 Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. N.Y. 1936).
54 Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382,
386 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
55 Id., 295 N.Y. Supp. at 388-9.
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terest, not to have been published for "advertising" or
"trade" purposes. And, in a federal case already referred to,56
the representation in a newsreel of a woman exercising in a
gymnasium was held a legitimate exercise of the right to
publish matters of a general interest.
VII.
Prospects for the Future
The analysis which precedes indicates that no matter how
antipodal the approach to the problem of privacy is between
courts which do and those which do not recognize its exist-
ence, means have been found to redress grievous wrongs.
Courts, when confronted with a legislative enactment such
as the New York statute, the object of which was to prevent
exploitation of another's name for commercial purposes, have
found no difficulty in interpreting it against the democratic
background of American life which gives full recognition, as
a constitutional guaranty, to the right of freedom of expres-
sion and communication and the freedom of information
which are integral parts of the guaranty of the First Amend-
ment.
A. Extremes of Approach:
There are, of course, extremes of approach taken, not so
much by jurists, as by persons who entertain diverse atti-
tudes as to what decency in the realm of publicity and dis-
closure should be. Speaking in 1930, a well-known professor
of journalism deplored the fact that some of the matters in
the lives of public characters in the past, which were con-
sidered strictly the private business of such characters, would
56 Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. N.Y. 1936).
57 U.S. CONST. AMD. I. Liberty of circulation and diffusion is an essential
part of the freedom of publication. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, 58
S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 24 L. Ed. 877,
879 (1878). See the writer's opinion in People v. Armentrout, 118 Cal. App. 761,
1 P. (2d) 556, 560 (1931).
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be exploited today with all the exaggerated techniques of
the modern newspaper coverage. He wrote: 58
Newspapers may have progressed in so-called enterprise
during the past hundred years, but they have not progressed
in their intelligence in their exercise of their legal rights. No
such unseemly invasions are recorded of the incident of the
sudden separation in 1829 of Governor Sam Houston of Ten-
nessee and his bride of three months. True, gossip flew un-
restrained, but there is no record that any newspaper at-
tempted to invade the governor's room at the hotel, or the
home of Mrs. Houston's parents, to which she had fled. To
this day, very few persons know what occurred between
Sam Houston and Eliza Allen.
Was it anybody's business but theirs? Only in that the
separation caused the Governor to resign. What occurred to
cause the separation was their own affair and no one else's.
But could they have retained the secret six hours today in the
face of modern newspaper practices represented by the hound-
ing, spying, bribing, stealing, camera-clicking reporter? No.
Professor Crosman would protect a wife or child against
the indiscretion of the husband or father, and would uphold,
as he put it, "the right to mourn death and to bury their
loved ones in peace and privacy." "
At the other end is a well-known writer on newspaper law
who, while admitting that the courts have drawn a valid
distinction between fictionalization and dramatization on the
one hand and the dissemination of news and information on
the other, has likened the right of privacy promulgated by
Warren and Brandeis in 1890 to a cloud which "has been
slowly casting its shadow over more and more of the decisions
of the courts throughout the country." 'o
B. Living in Public:
Those who would forbid publication entirely without con-
sent overlook the proper function of the newspaper and other
58 Crosman, Freedom of the Press in 1930, 2 Western Publisher No. 17,
1930, p. 7.
59 Ibid.
00 Gray, supra note 50.
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media of communication and expression in modern demo-
cratic society. Whether we like it or not, we have no more
privacy than the proverbial gold fish. If we participate in
any manner in the life of a community, we live in public.
What is news is a matter of place and circumstance. Society,
through legislation, has invaded what we once considered the
private domain. We have laws, both state and federal, which
forbid political coercion and political tests for office, and even
inquiry into a person's political or religious beliefs as a basis
for private or public employment." Yet, in recent years, laws
have been sustained which require exculpatory oaths of one
kind or another for organizations seeking governmental inter-
vention or for persons serving the public, 2 and laws curtail-
ing what would ordinarily be considered the legitimate exer-
cise of political activities by government employees. 3
So in modern American living, in many respects, the out-
side world has invaded what was once considered the indi-
vidual's private domain. This being the pattern of our society,
it was to be expected that the newspaper and other media
61 22 STAT. 403 (1883), 5 U.S.C. § 633 (2) (5) (1946) (forbidding prejudice
in civil service for failure to make contributions for political purposes); 22 STAT.
403 (1883), 5 U.S.C. § 633 (2) (6) (1946) (prohibiting coercion) ; 60 STAT. 1030,
22 U.S.C. § 807 (1946) (prohibiting political tests and discrimination on account
of race, creed or color in the foreign service of the United States); CAL. LAOR
CODE § 1101 (Deering 1943) (prohibiting private employers from forbidding
employees to engage in politics and be candidates for public office, or from
controlling their political activities); CAL. LABOR CODE § 1102 (Deering 1943)
(prohibiting coercion or influence on the political activities of employees). Any
violation of these provisions is penalized as a crime. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1103
(Deering 1943). A civil action for damages is also authorized for injury suffered
from violation. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1105 (Deering 1943).
62 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (Supp. 1951), American Com-
munications Assn., C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S. Ct. 674, 94 L. Ed. 925
(1950); Adler v. Board of Education of City of New York, -.-- U.S....., 72 S. Ct.
380, 96 L. Ed. *295 (1952); Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles,
341 U.S. 716, 71 S. Ct. 909, 95 L. Ed. 1317 (1951).
63 53 STAT. 1148 (1939), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 118i (Supp. 1951), United
Public Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S. Ct. 556, 91
L. Ed. 754 (1947). We have become slaves of slogans. In his famous Folkways,
William Graham Sumner remarked: "The power of watchwords consists in the
cluster of suggestions which has become fastened upon them. In the Middle Ages
the word 'heretic' won a frightful suggestion of base wickedness. In the seventeenth
century the same suggestions were connected with the words 'witch' and 'traitor.'"
SuiNER, FoLKwAys 21 (Keller ed. 1940). Now it is "subversive."
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of communication which mirror the activities of that society,
should make a different approach to what news is.
Walter Lippman once defined news as "not a mirror of
social conditions, but the report of an aspect that has ob-
truded itself." 1 Things unusual make news, according to
the old saying of the newspaper profession that if a dog
bites a man, it is not news, but if a man bites a dog, it is.
Under the conditions just described, it is illusory to expect
the newspapers and other media of communication and
expression to retreat into the type of ivory tower to which
those who sigh for the past would relegate them.
C. The Freedom of Information and Communication:
Through legislative enactments, administrative and execu-
tive decrees, grounded on security and other reasons, there
is a constant attempt to limit freedom of information and
communication. Many persons see in this a grave danger to
freedom of expression. In October, 1951, the members of a
Northwestern University Forum, representing leading news-
papers in the Americas, declared that the integrity of freedom
of information goes to the very roots of popular government
in the United States. And they declared that this right was
being constantly undermined by certain practices. The resolu-
tion read: 11
That this fundamental right of the people is being steadily
undermined by the growing practice of secrecy in govern-
ment on national, state and local levels; the growing tendency
of public officials to feel that they are not accountable to the
public; that they may conduct the business of their offices in
secret; that they may seal or impound public records; that
they may divulge only such information as they think is good
for the people to know; that they may extend "military se-
curity" into areas of news which have no bearing on the
nation's security, as shown by the dangers in an executive
order issued within the week.
64 LiPpMANN, PU3LIC OPINIOIT 341 (1922).
65 Editor & Publisher, Oct. 6, 1951, p. 10, col. 1, 2-3.
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This is the pattern by which the Fascists in Italy, the Nazis
in Germany, the Bolsheviks in Russia, the Peronistas in
Argentina began to limit the right of their people to know,
forced their newspapers into complete subjection and were able
to take from them all their other democratic rights as well.
And there is a movement to have the right embodied in a
congressional enactment.66
So, in assaying the problem we are discussing, to me, as a
believer in the democratic process, the solution lies not in
curtailment of the right, but, rather, in its broader recogni-
tion by the courts. The social demands on the press and other
media of communication and expression are becoming more
and more exacting. In this, as in all other domains per-
taining to democratic society, the relief from occasional
abuses must come from the self-discipline of the media them-
selves, under the spur and pressure of an enlightened public
opinion. The Report of the Commission on Freedom of the
Press stated truly that "The press itself is always one of
the chief agents in destroying or in building the bases of its
own significance." 67 This is true also of other media of com-
munication and expression.
The battle for truthful and responsible expression and
creation is constantly on. In it the modern newspaper and
other media of communication, expression and creation, are
the main participants. They may become leading actors in
its attainment if they live up to the responsibilities which
their great powers in modern society entail.
Leon R. Yankwich*
66 Editor & Publisher, Dec. 8, 1951, p. 18, col. 1.
67 THE CoMmissioN ON FREEDOM OF THE PRsss, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE
PREss 133 (1947). And see, Miller, Principles of Law Limiting Radio Broadcasting,
9 F.R.D. 217 (1950).
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